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FEDERALISM BY DECEPTION: THE IMPLIED LIMITS
ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER
Bryan K. Fair 
The purpose of this Article is to lay bare federalism by deception
and the theory of implied limits on federal power. Other scholars have
recently noted the rise of anti-federalist viewpoints in modern cases. I
go a step further to demonstrate how Supreme Court Justices have
embraced anti-federal ideology, but have cited Federalist sources,
including Marshall, to announce unenumerated limits on federal
legislative power.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During this hyper-partisan moment in our national history, one of
the most divisive issues involves determining the constitutional limits on
federal legislative power. Whether discussing national legislation on
climate change, voting rights, police violence, criminal justice reform,
sexual violence, wage inequity, educational inequality, pandemic
mandates, health disparities or access to health care, the question
frequently arises—what are the constitutional limits on Congress to
regulate in such areas of national concern? No one contends that
Congress has unlimited powers. Instead, the division rests on whether
the limits on congressional power are solely those prescribed in the
constitutional text or whether they extend to other limits deduced by the
Court. This Article investigates the issue as presented in the Supreme
Court, historically and today.
A recent illustration of this issue is the continuing litigation by
individuals or states attacking the Affordable Care Act on the grounds
that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority.1 Such disputes call
to mind earlier federalism debates from the founding generation
regarding the nature and scope of the Constitution, which remain
contested nearly two and a half centuries later. Although the text of the
Constitution declares itself the supreme law of the land, across our
national history, the Court has not offered a consistent interpretation of
the nature of federal legislative power or its limits within our federalist
system, leading to significant doctrinal turmoil.

1. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 519 (2012). Another example
is the judicial assault on key provisions of the Voting Rights Act. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder,
570 U.S. 529 (2013).
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An early example of this turmoil can be found in the Supreme
Court’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.2 There, Chief Justice John
Marshall, a leading Federalist politician and jurist, asserted vigorously
that, under our constitutional system, Congress had broad plenary
powers, permitting the Nation’s legislature to enact any reasonable law
that might aid its accomplishment of any of its enumerated powers.3 The
Marshall Court repudiated any pretense that Maryland had power over
the national government, including a power to tax federal property.4
Indeed, Marshall introduced the Doctrine of Implied Powers, finding no
express limits on implied federal legislative powers in the Constitution,
as had existed in the Articles of Confederation.5 Marshall relied on the
Constitution’s Article I, Section 8, Necessary and Proper Clause to
support his theory that Congress had broad implied powers to adopt any
reasonable legislation not subject to prescribed constitutional limits.6
Speaking of the Commerce Clause power, Marshall wrote, “This power,
like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised
to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the constitution.”7 I call this view Marshallian federalism.
Of course, uncertainty about how the new Constitution would
impact the states, their representatives, and the people was one of the
chief reasons anti-federalists opposed it, preferring smaller regional
leagues or confederacies over a larger national Union.8 On that score, it
appeared the Federalists prevailed, with the adoption of the Constitution
and the creation of the three branches of the national government.
Pursuant to Article I, the federal legislature would be made up of the
people’s representatives elected from the states, effectively protecting
the states from federal overreach.9 That instrumental structure did not

2. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 316 (1819).
3. Id.
4. See id. at 391-96.
5. See id. at 406-07.
6. See id. at 412-14.
7. Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 61
(James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003) (“[T]he general government is not to be charged
with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain
enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be
attained by the separate provisions of any.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra, at 106-07
(Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, supra, at 142-43 (Alexander Hamilton) (“A
government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the
objects committed to its care, and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is
responsible; free from every other control, but a regard to the public good and to the sense of
the people.”).
8. See infra Part II.B. and accompanying notes.
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1-2.
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satisfy all opponents of the Constitution, including some on the Court,
then and now.10
In this Article, I argue that in recent years, Justices have repudiated
Marshallian federalism by asserting a series of unenumerated, implied
limits on federal legislative power derived from an expansive reading of
Tenth Amendment or state sovereignty principles.11 I call this antifederal counter-theory the Doctrine of Implied Limits on Federal Power.
I illustrate that in several recent cases, including New York v. United
States,12 Printz v. United States,13 and NFIB v. Sebelius,14 among others,
the Court has quietly announced the Doctrine of Implied Limits, which,
sub silentio, has displaced Marshall’s Doctrine of Implied Powers.
Beyond this point, I make one additional claim: the proponents of the
theory of implied limits cite Marshall and other Federalists, rather than
their anti-federalist ideological heirs. I label that move federalism by
deception.
The purpose of this Article is to lay bare federalism by deception
and the theory of implied limits on federal power. Other scholars have
recently noted the rise of anti-federalist viewpoints in modern cases. I
go a step further to demonstrate how Supreme Court Justices have
embraced anti-federal ideology, but have cited Federalist sources,
including Marshall, to announce unenumerated limits on federal
legislative power.
In Part II, I recall the Federalist versus anti-federalist debate over
the adoption of the Constitution and its contemporary relevance to the
Court’s analysis of the limits on federal power.15 Beyond traditional
Federalist writings, I lift anti-federalist writings, not to endorse them, but
to allow comparison between the views expressed then and current
rationales supporting implied limits on federal legislative power.
In Part III, I excavate the early writings of John Marshall in support
of ratification of the Constitution and his declaration of the Doctrine of
Implied Powers, illuminating its commanding status in early Supreme
Court jurisprudence, especially McCulloch v. Maryland and its
progeny.16
In Part IV, I examine the opinions of several Supreme Court
Justices, especially former Associate Justice O’Connor’s writing, most

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra Part IV.A. and accompanying notes.
See infra Part IV.B. and accompanying notes.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
See infra Part II.A. and accompanying notes.
See infra Part III.B. and accompanying notes.
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notably in New York v. United States, in which she and other Justices
implied new, unenumerated limits on federal power from the Tenth
Amendment and state sovereignty doctrine, sketching the contours of the
Doctrine of Implied Limits on Federal Power.17 Next, I describe the
current ideological battleground for these competing theories, examining
their application in Sebelius. Not only does the Court imply limits on
federal power, but it also frequently cites Marshall and other Federalist
writings, rather than citing similar anti-federalist writings.
In conclusion, I explain why I reject federalism by deception and
why I think Marshallian federalism should regain ascendancy.18
II. FEDERALISM AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION
One of the central claims of this Article is that debates between
Federalists and anti-federalists, which arose before and during the
ratification of the Constitution, have remained unresolved, despite the
adoption of the new Constitution nearly twelve score years ago, as well
as the expansion of constitutional restrictions on the states following the
Civil War. To illustrate this point, I begin with a basic review of the
essential arguments of the Federalists and the anti-federalists regarding
the new Constitution and the nature of federal power. A second claim is
that one can read the Doctrine of Implied Limits on Federal Power
through an eighteenth-century anti-federalist understanding of the nature
of federal power. In Part IV.B., I argue that in justifying implied limits
on federal legislative power, Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice
Roberts, among others, express anti-federal concerns and language while
citing selected federalist sources. I name that maneuver federalism by
deception.
A. What the Federalists Thought
The Federalists supported the adoption of the Constitution for
myriad reasons, expressing many of them collectively in a series of
letters to the people of New York.19 First, the Federalists believed that
17. See infra Part IV.A.3. and accompanying notes.
18. See infra Part IV.3.B. and accompanying notes.
19. Each Federalist Paper opens with “To the People of the State of New York.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 7, at 4 (Alexander Hamilton) (summarizing the goals of the
Federalist Papers as showing: “[t]he utility of the Union to your political prosperity, [t]he
insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve that Union, [t]he necessity of a
government at least equally energetic with the one proposed to the attainment of this object,
[t]he conformity of the proposed constitution to the true principles of republican government,
[i]ts analogy to your own state constitution and lastly, [t]he additional security, which its
adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of government, to liberty, and to
property”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 7, at 431 (Alexander Hamilton) (“A
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a larger, united republic was better than smaller divided republics.20
Second, they believed that man was corrupt and as a result, state
governments would always be in conflict.21 The view of man’s
corruption may have arisen from the Federalist writers’ belief in the
Puritan view of the total depravity of man, or from their appeals to the
public’s belief in the total depravity of man.22 As one commentator put
it, “Publius and his fellow Federalists were defending a design for a new
kind of republic, the likes of which had never previously existed—an
‘enlarged’ or ‘extended republic.’ ” 23 James Madison offered a similar
justification and need for the new Constitution, stating, “Hence it clearly
appears, that the same advantage, which a Republic has over a
Democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large
over a small Republic—is enjoyed by the Union over the States
composing it.”24
Alexander Hamilton, who led the campaign, with Madison and
John Jay, to persuade New York’s ratification of the new Constitution,
wrote,
A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously
doubt, that if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only
united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they
might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each
other. To presume a want of motives for such contests, as an
argument against their existence would be to forget that men are
ambitious, vindictive and rapacious.25

On the corruptive hostilities among states and their leaders, Hamilton
wrote,

NATION, without a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, is, in my view, an awful spectacle. The
establishment of a constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole
people, is a PRODIGY, to the completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety.”);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 7, at 168 (James Madison) (“[T]he ultimate object of
these papers is to determine clearly and fully the merits of this Constitution, and the
expediency of adopting it . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, supra note 7, at 179 (James
Madison).
20. See supra note 19 and accompanying notes.
21. See supra note 19 and accompanying notes.
22. See supra note 19 and accompanying notes.
23. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST: WITH
LETTERS OF “BRUTUS,” at xxi (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 7, at 46 (James Madison) (“[I]t clearly appears,
that the same advantage which a Republic has over a Democracy, in controlling the effects of
faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small Republic,—is enjoyed by the Union over the States
composing it.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 7, at 255 (James Madison) (“[T]he
larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of
self government.”).
25. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6, supra note 7, at 19 (Alexander Hamilton).
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The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are
some which have a general and almost constant operation upon the
collective bodies of society: Of this description are the love of power
or the desire of preeminence and dominion—the jealousy of power,
or the desire of equality and safety. . . . Men of this class, whether
the favourites of a king or of a people, have in too many instances
abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of
some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national
tranquility to personal advantage, or personal gratification.26

The Federalists feared the corruption of man and believed it caused
the states to be in danger of attacking one another, or of attack from the
outside, and that the economic prosperity of the nation was in danger.27
For these reasons, the Federalists supported a strong government that
could defend and resolve conflicts among the states.28 They also favored

26. Id. at 20.
27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 7, at 11-12 (John Jay); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10,
supra note 7, at 42 (James Madison) (“So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into
mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and
fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their
most violent conflicts.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 7, at 172-73 (James Madison);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 7, at 252 (James Madison) (“If men were angels, no
government would be necessary. . . . In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to
controul the governed; and in the next place oblige it to controul itself.”); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 15, supra note 7, at 69-70 (Alexander Hamilton); T HE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 7,
at 381 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[C]onstitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of
those ill humors, which the arts of designing men . . . sometimes disseminate among the
people themselves, and which . . . have a tendency, in the mean time, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the
community.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 7, at 426-27 (Alexander Hamilton).
28. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6, supra note 7, at 19 (Alexander Hamilton) (“I shall now
proceed to delineate dangers of a different, and, perhaps, still more alarming kind, those which
will in all probability flow from dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic
factions and convulsions.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, supra note 7, at 25-26, 30 (Alexander
Hamilton) (“The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States or
confederacies, and different foreign nations, and the effects of this situation upon the peace of
the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, supra note 7, at
30 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Assuming it therefore as an established truth that the several
States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out
of the wreck of the general confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and
war, of friendship and enmity with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring
nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the
consequences that would attend such a situation.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra note 7, at
35 (Alexander Hamilton) (“A Firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and
liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection.”); T HE FEDERALIST
NO. 25, supra note 7, at 115-16 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note
7, at 426-27 (Alexander Hamilton).

552

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:62

taxes to support a strong national government.29 The Federalists thought
that the nation was in danger of attack without a unifying Constitution.30
Hamilton believed that the Constitution “would preserve the liberties
won during the American Revolution and serve as a bulwark against
interstate anarchy and civil war, and hence against invasion, occupation,
and subjugation by foreign powers.”31
The Federalists wrote that the nation would be more economically
prosperous under the Constitution. In their view, “a vigorous national
government” and “the natural strength and resources of the country”
would allow the United States to beat European economies if the nation
could be directed toward a common interest.32 The Federalists asserted
that a national government was necessary to adjudicate the differences
among the states, stating that:
[I]f it be possible at any rate to construct a Federal Government
capable of regulating the common concerns and preserving the
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, supra note 7, at 53, 56 (Alexander Hamilton); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 7, at 97 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 31,
supra note 7, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton) (“As revenue is the essential engine by which the
means of answering the national exigencies must be procured, the power of procuring that
article in its full extent must necessarily be comprehended in that of providing for those
exigencies. As theory and practice conspire to prove that the power of procuring revenue is
unavailing, when exercised over the States in their collective capacities, the Federal
government must of necessity be invested with an unqualified power of taxation in the
ordinary modes.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, supra note 7, at 156-57 (Alexander Hamilton).
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, supra note 7, at 14 (John Jay) (“Wisely therefore do [the
people] consider Union and a good national Government as necessary to put and keep them
in such a situation [of peace] as instead of inviting war, will tend to repress and discourage
it.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 5, supra note 7, at 18-19 (John Jay); THE FEDERALIST NO. 6,
supra note 7, at 19 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 7, at 105
(Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, supra note 7, at 115 (Alexander Hamilton);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, supra note 7, at 124 (Alexander Hamilton).
31. HAMILTON, MADISON & JAY, supra note 23, at xviii; THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, supra
note 7, at 63-64 (James Madison) (“Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the
revolution for which a precedent could not be discovered, no government established of which
an exact model did not present itself, the people of the United States might, at this moment,
have been numbered among the melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have
been labouring under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of
the rest of mankind. . . . They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals
of human society . . . . They formed the design of a great confederacy, which it is incumbent
on their successors to improve and perpetuate.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 7, at
181-82 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 7, at 224 (James Madison);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, supra note 7, at 113-14 (Alexander Hamilton).
32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, supra note 7, at 49, 51-52 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Under
a vigorous national government, the natural strength and resources of the country, directed to
a common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our
growth.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, supra note 7, at 52 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The effects
of union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have been sufficiently delineated. Its
tendency to promote the interests of revenue will be the subject of our present enquiry.”); T HE
FEDERALIST NO. 13, supra note 7, at 57, 59 (Alexander Hamilton).
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general tranquility, it must be founded, as to the objects committed
to its care, upon the reverse of the principle contended for by the
opponents of the proposed constitution.33

B. What the Anti-Federalists Thought About the Constitution
Opponents of the Constitution were equally vigorous in their efforts
to persuade the people to reject it, expressing several themes in their
widely circulated tracts. They argued that the preservation of individual
liberty is the purpose of government.34 On liberty and government,
Patrick Henry said, “You are not to inquire how your trade may be
increased, nor how you are to become a great and powerful people, but
how your liberties can be secured; for liberty ought to be the direct end
of your Government.”35
33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, supra note 7, at 73 (Alexander Hamilton); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 7, at 386, 388-89 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It seems scarcely
to admit of controversy that the judiciary authority of the union ought to extend to these
several descriptions of causes . . . [t]o all those which involve the PEACE of the
CONFEDERACY, whether they relate to the intercourse between the United States and
foreign nations, or to that between the States themselves . . . .”).
34. Patrick Henry, Patrick Henry Speech Before Virginia Ratifying Convention,
TEACHING AM. HIST. (June 5, 1788), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/patrickhenry-virginia-ratifying-convention-va/.
35. Id. For similar reflections, see Brutus, no. 1, in 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981), https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/coretexts/_files/resources/
texts/c/1787%20Brutus%201.pdf (“[W]hatever government we adopt, it ought to be a free
one; that it should be so framed as to secure the liberty of the citizens of America, and such
an one as to admit of a full, fair, and equal representation of the people.”); Centinel & Samuel
Bryan,
Centinel
XI,
TEACHING
AM.
HIST.
(Jan.
16,
1788),
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/centinel-xi/ (“[T]he new constitution may not
only be inadequate as a remedy, but destructive of liberty, and the completion of misery
. . . .”);
Cincinnatus
VI,
TEACHING
AM.
HIST.
(Dec.
6,
1787),
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/cincinnatus-vi/ (“I trust, that [the people] will
have discernment to discover the parts which are incompatible with their rights and liberties,
and spirit to insist upon those parts being amended.”); Letters from The Federal Farmer to
The Republican IV, LEE FAM. DIGITAL ARCHIVE (Oct. 12, 1787),
https://leefamilyarchive.org/papers/essays/fedfarmer/04.html (“There are certain rights which
we have always held sacred in the United States, and recognized in all our constitutions, and
which, by the adoption of the new constitution in its present form, will be left unsecured.”);
Letters from The Federal Farmer to The Republican IV, supra (“It is not my object to
enumerate rights of inconsiderable importance; but there are others, no doubt, which ought to
be established as a fundamental part of the national system.”); Letters from The Federal
Farmer to The Republican VI, LEE FAM. DIGITAL ARCHIVE (Dec. 25, 1787),
https://leefamilyarchive.org/papers/essays/fedfarmer/06.html (“Of rights, some are natural
and unalienable, of which even the people cannot deprive individuals: Some are constitutional
or fundamental; these cannot be altered or abolished by the ordinary laws; but the people, by
express acts, may alter or abolish them . . . .”); Letters from The Federal Farmer to The
Republican
XVI,
LEE
FAM.
DIGITAL
ARCHIVE
(Jan.
20,
1788),
https://leefamilyarchive.org/papers/essays/fedfarmer/16.html (“[T]he people especially
having began, ought to go through enumerating, and establish particularly all the rights of
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A related theme was that the smaller, more local form of
government found in the states was more capable of protecting
individual liberty.36 For example, consider Luther Martin’s comment
that:
At the separation from the British Empire, the people of America
preferred the establishment of themselves into thirteen separate
sovereignties instead of incorporating themselves into one: to these
individuals, which can by any possibility come in question in making and executing federal
laws.”); John DeWitt, John DeWitt III, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Nov. 5, 1787) [hereinafter
DeWitt, John DeWitt III], https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/john-dewitt-iii/ (“In
short, my fellow—citizens, [the proposed Constitution] can be said to be nothing less than a
hasty stride to Universal Empire in this Western World, flattering, very flattering to young
ambitious minds, but fatal to the liberties of the people.”); An Old Whig IV, TEACHING AM.
HIST. (Oct. 27, 1787), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/an-old-whig-iv/ (“[W]e
ought carefully to guard ourselves by a Bill of Rights, against the invasion of those liberties
which it is essential for us to retain . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
36. See HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 15 (1981); see
also Brutus, no.1, supra note 35 (“[A] free republic cannot succeed over a country of such
immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants, and these increasing in such rapid
progression as that of the whole United States.”); Cato, Cato III, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Oct.
25, 1787) [hereinafter Cato, Cato III], https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/cato-iii/
(“It is natural, says Montesquieu, to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it
cannot long subsist . . . . In large republics, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views,
in a small one, the interest of the public is easily perceived, better understood, and more within
the reach of every citizen; abuses have a less extent, and of course are less protected . . . .”
(emphasis omitted)); Centinel & Samuel Bryan, Centinel III, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Nov. 8,
1787), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/centinel-iii/ (“[A] confederation of
small republics, possessing all the powers of internal government, and united in the
management of their general and foreign concerns, is the only system of government, by
which so extensive a country can be governed consistent with freedom . . . .”); Samuel Bryan,
Centinel V, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Dec. 4, 1787) [hereinafter Bryan, Centinel V],
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/centinel-v/ (“[O]ne consolidated government,
will not answer for so extensive a territory as the United States includes, that slavery would
be the necessary fate of the people under such a government . . . .”); Centinel & Samuel Bryan,
Centinel XIV, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Feb. 5, 1788), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/
document/centinel-xiv/ (“[T]he only method by which an extensive continent like America
could be connected and united together consistent with the principles of freedom, must be by
having a number of strong and energetic state governments for securing and protecting the
rights of the individuals forming those governments . . . .”); Letters from The Federal Farmer
to The Republican II, LEE FAM. DIGITAL ARCHIVE (Oct. 9, 1787),
https://leefamilyarchive.org/papers/essays/fedfarmer/02.html (“It is apparently impracticable
that [Congress adequately represent the people] in this extensive country—it would be
impossible to collect a representation of the parts of the country five, six, and seven hundred
miles from the seat of government.”); An Old Whig IV, supra note 35 (“One thing is evident,
that no republic of so great a magnitude, ever did, or ever can exist. . . . The continent of
North-America can no more be governed by one republic, than the fabled Atlas could support
the heavens.”); Letters from The Federal Farmer to The Republican III, LEE FAM. DIGITAL
ARCHIVE (Oct. 10, 1787), https://leefamilyarchive.org/papers/essays/fedfarmer/03.html
(“[M]any differences peculiar to Eastern, Middle, and Southern states . . . are not so
perceivable among the members of congress, and men of general information in the states, as
among the men who would properly form the democratic branch.”).
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they look up for the security of their lives, liberties, & properties: to
these they must look up—The federal Govt. they formed, to defend
the whole agst. foreign nations, in case of war, and to defend the
lesser States agst. the ambition of the larger. . . .37

The anti-federalists based the above beliefs on three main
principles:38
1. Only a small republic can enjoy a voluntary attachment of the
people to the government and a voluntary obedience to the laws.39
2. Only a small republic can secure a genuine responsibility of the
government to the people.40
37. See STORING, supra note 36.
38. Id. at 16.
39. See Brutus, no.1, supra note 35 (“[W]hen a government is to receive its support from
the aid of the citizens, it must be so constructed as to have the confidence, respect, and
affection of the people.”); Brutus IV, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Nov. 29, 1787),
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/brutus-iv/ (“A farther objection against the
feebleness of the representation is, that it will not possess the confidence of the people. The
execution of the laws in a free government must rest on this confidence, and this must be
founded on the good opinion they entertain of the framers of the laws. Every government must
be supported, either by the people having such an attachment to it, as to be ready, when called
upon, to support it, or by a force at the command of the government, to compel obedience.”);
Letters from The Federal Farmer to The Republican II, supra note 36 (“[T]he laws of a free
government rest on the confidence of the people, and operate gently—and never can extend
their influence very far—if they are executed on free principles, about the centre, where the
benefits of the government induce the people to support it voluntarily; yet they must be
executed on the principles of fear and force in the extremes . . . .”); Letters from The Federal
Farmer to The Republican III, supra note 36 (“The great object of a free people must be so to
form their government and laws, and so to administer them, as to create a confidence in, and
respect for the laws; and thereby induce the sensible and virtuous part of the community to
declare in favor of the laws, and to support them without an expensive military force.”).
40. See Brutus, no.1, supra note 35 (“In so extensive a republic, the great officers of
government would soon become above the control of the people, and abuse their power to the
purpose of aggrandizing themselves, and oppressing them.”); Centinel & Samuel Bryan,
Centinel VI, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Dec. 25, 1787) [hereinafter Centinel & Bryan, Centinel
VI], https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/centinel-vi/ (“[L]iberty is only to be
preserved by a due responsibility in the government . . . .”); Letters from The Federal Farmer
to The Republican VII, LEE FAM. DIGITAL ARCHIVE (Dec. 31, 1787),
https://leefamilyarchive.org/papers/essays/fedfarmer/07.html (“In forming [the legislative]
branch, therefore, several important considerations must be attended to. It must possess
abilities to discern the situation of the people and of public affairs, a disposition to sympathize
with the people, and a capacity and inclination to make laws congenial to their circumstances
and condition: it must afford security against interested combinations, corruption and
influence; it must possess the confidence, and have the voluntary support of the people.”);
Letters from The Federal Farmer to The Republican IX, LEE FAM. DIGITAL ARCHIVE (Jan. 4,
1788), https://leefamilyarchive.org/papers/essays/fedfarmer/09.html (“Clear it is, by
increasing the representation we lessen the prospects of each member of congress being
provided for in public offices; we proportionably lessen official influence, and strengthen his
prospects of becoming a private citizen, subject to the common burdens, without the
compensation of the emoluments of office.”); Letters from The Federal Farmer to The
Republican XI, LEE FAM. DIGITAL ARCHIVE (Jan. 10, 1788), https://leefamilyarchive.org/
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3. Only a small republic can form the kind of citizens who will
maintain a republican government.41
The anti-federalists opposed the Constitution because they feared
“that representation in Congress could not possibly be adequate to fulfill
its proper mission, which was to keep elected officials responsible to
their constituents.”42 They believed “Congress could not represent all
the varied interests existing in the United States. Some Men—whether
fishermen, farmers of a particular kind, or some other group—
effectively would not be represented. These men might vote, but they
papers/essays/fedfarmer/11.html (“The senators will represent sovereignties, which generally
have, and always ought to retain, the power of recalling their agents; the principle of
responsibility is strongly felt in men who are liable to be recalled and censured for their
misconduct . . . .”).
41. See Samuel Bryan, Centinel I, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Oct. 5, 1787) [hereinafter
Bryan, Centinel I], https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/centinel-i/ (“ ‘ A
republican, or free government, can only exist where the body of the people are virtuous’ . . . .
The highest responsibility is to be attained, in a simple structure of government, for the great
body of the people never steadily attend to the operations of government, and for want of due
information are liable to be imposed on . . . .”); Centinel & Bryan, Centinel VI, supra note 40
(“[L]iberty is only to be preserved . . . by constant attention of the people . . . .”); John DeWitt,
John DeWitt I, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Oct. 22, 1787), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/
document/john-dewitt-i/ (“It is the duty of every one in the Commonwealth to communicate
his sentiments to his neighbour, divested of passion, and equally so of prejudices.”).
42. See Brutus IV, supra note 39 (“The number will be so small that but a very few of
the most sensible and respectable yeomanry of the country can ever have any knowledge of
them: being so far removed from the people, their station will be elevated and important, and
they will be considered as ambitious and designing. They will not be viewed by the people as
part of themselves, but as a body distinct from them, and having separate interests to pursue;
the consequence will be, that a perpetual jealousy will exist in the minds of the people against
them; their conduct will be narrowly watched; their measures scrutinized; and their laws
opposed, evaded, or reluctantly obeyed.”); Brutus, Brutus XVI, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Apr.
10, 1788), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/brutus-xvi/ (“Men long in office are
very apt to feel themselves independent [and] to form and pursue interests separate from those
who appointed them. And this is more likely to be the case with the senate, as they will for
the most part of the time be absent from the state they represent, and associate with such
company as will possess very little of the feelings of the middling class of people.”); Cato,
Cato V, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Nov. 22, 1787) [hereinafter Cato, Cato V],
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/cato-v/ (“It is a very important objection to this
government, that the representation consists of so few; too few to resist the influence of
corruption, and the temptation to treachery, against which all governments ought to take
precautions. . . .”); Cato, Cato VI, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Dec. 13, 1787),
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/cato-vi/ (“[W]hen the senate, so important a
branch of the legislature, is so far removed from the people, as to have little or no connexion
[sic] with them . . . .”); Dewitt, John DeWitt III, supra note 35 (stating that the members of
the House of Representatives “become strangers to the very people choosing them, they reside
at a distance from you, you have no control over them, you cannot observe their conduct, and
they have to consult and finally be guided by twelve other States, whose interests are, in all
material points, directly opposed to yours”); Letters from The Federal Farmer to The
Republican XI, supra note 40 (“Men elected for several years, several hundred miles distant
from their states, possessed of very extensive powers, and the means of paying themselves,
will not, probably, be oppressed with a sense of dependance and responsibility.”).
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would have no chance, given the mathematics of the situation, actually
elect someone who would protect their interests.”43 The anti-federalists
feared that the change from the Articles of Confederation to the
Constitution (particularly the hurried method of adopting the
Constitution) would allow for an aristocratic rule, which in turn would
suppress individual liberty.44
43. Bruce Frohnen, Introduction to THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: SELECTED WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES, at xiii, xxvii (Bruce Frohnen ed., Regnery Publ’g 1999); see also Bryan, Centinel
I, supra note 41 (“The number of the representatives . . . appears to be too few, either to
communicate the requisite information, of the wants, local circumstances and sentiments of
so extensive an empire, or to prevent corruption and undue influence, in the exercise of such
great powers . . . .”); Cincinnatus, Cincinnatus IV: To James Wilson, Esquire, TEACHING AM.
HIST.
(Nov.
22,
1787)
[hereinafter
Cincinnatus,
Cincinnatus
IV],
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/cincinnatus-iv-to-james-wilson-esquire/ (“In
point of number therefore and the weight derived from [the House], the representative
proposed by the constitution is remarkably feeble.”); Cato, Cato III, supra note 36 (“[T]he
dissimilitude of interest, morals, and politics, in almost every one, will receive it as an intuitive
truth, that a consolidated republican form of government therein, can never form a perfect
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, promote the general welfare, and secure
the blessings of liberty to you and your posterity, for to these objects it must be directed. This
unkindred legislature therefore, composed of interests opposite and dissimilar in their nature,
will in its exercise, emphatically be like a house divided against itself.” (emphasis omitted));
Cato, Cato V, supra note 42 (“[T]he number of representatives are too few. . . .”); Cato, Cato
V, supra note 42 (“Another thing [that] may be suggested against the small number of
representatives is, that but few of you will have the chance of sharing even in this branch of
the legislature; and that the choice will be confined to a very few; the more complete it is, the
better will your interests be preserved . . . .”); Letters from The Federal Farmer to The
Republican III, supra note 36 (“As to the organization—the house of representatives, the
democrative branch, as it is called, is to consist of 65 members: that is, about one
representative for fifty thousand inhabitants . . . . I have no idea that the interests, feelings,
and opinions of three or four millions of people, especially touching internal taxation, can be
collected in such a house.”); Letters from The Federal Farmer to The Republican VII, supra
note 40 (“[T]here ought to be an increase of the numbers of representatives . . . .” (emphasis
omitted)); Letters from The Federal Farmer to The Republican IX, supra note 40 (“How far
we ought to increase the representation I will not pretend to say; but that we ought to increase
it very considerably, is clear—to double it at least, making full allowances for the state
representations: and this we may evidently do, and approach accordingly towards safety and
perfection, without encountering any inconveniences.”); Richard Henry Lee, Federal Farmer
X, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Jan. 7, 1788), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/federal
-farmer-x/ (“I have dwelt much longer than I expected upon the increasing the representation,
the democratic interest in the federal system; but I hope the importance of the subject will
justify my dwelling upon it.”).
44. See STORING, supra note 36, at 48; see also Bryan, Centinel I, supra note 41 (“From
this investigation into the organization of this government, it appears that it is devoid of all
responsibility or accountability to the great body of the people, and that so far from being a
regular balanced government, it would be in practice a permanent ARISTOCRACY.”); Cato,
Cato V, supra note 42 (“[T]he mode in which they are appointed and their duration, will lead
to the establishment of an aristocracy . . . .”); Centinel & Samuel Bryan, Centinel II,
TEACHING AM. HIST. (Oct. 24, 1787) [hereinafter Centinel & Bryan, Centinel II],
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/centinel-ii/ (“The injunction of secrecy
imposed on the members of the late Convention during their deliberations, was obviously
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Many other concerns animated anti-federalist writings, including
the efficiency of the existing government and the fear of a national
standing army, but they are beyond the scope of this Article.45 Perhaps
most relevant to this Article, the anti-federalists were cautious of the
Constitution’s “broad grants of power taken together with the
‘supremacy’ and ‘the necessary and proper’ clauses,” because these
“amounted to an unlimited grant of power to the general government to
do whatever it might choose to do.”46
dictated by the genius of Aristocracy; it was deemed impolitic to unfold the principles of the
intended government to the people, as this would have frustrated the object in view.”);
Centinel & Bryan, Centinel II, supra (“In my first number, I stated that [the Senate] would be
a very unequal representation of the several states . . . and that possessing a considerable share
in the executive as well as legislative, it would become a permanent aristocracy, and swallow
up the other orders in the government.” (emphasis omitted)); Cincinnatus, Cincinnatus IV,
supra note 43 (“[T]he most exceptionable part of the Constitution the senate. In this . . .
‘perhaps there never was a charge made with less reason, than that which predicts the
institution of a baneful aristocracy in the Foederal Senate.’ ” ); Cincinnatus, Cincinnatus IV,
supra note 43 (“[T]he senate . . . must necessarily produce a baneful aristocracy, by which the
democratic rights of the people will be overwhelmed.”); Cincinnatus V: To James Wilson,
Esquire, New York Journal, in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009),
https://csac.history.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/281/2017/07/Cincinnatus_V.pdf
(“[P]ower is to be vested in an aristocratic senate . . . .”); DeWitt, John DeWitt III, supra note
35 (“Upon an attentive examination you can pronounce [the Constitution] nothing less, than
a government which in a few years, will degenerate to a complete Aristocracy, armed with
powers unnecessary in any case to bestow, and which in its vortex swallows up every other
Government upon the Continent.”); JOHN DEWITT, ESSAY IV (1787), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES, 507 (Bruce Frohnen ed., 1999) (“[T]here
cannot remain a doubt in the mind of any reflecting man, that it is a System purely
Aristocratical, calculated to find employment for men of ambition, and to furnish means of
sporting with the sacred principles of human nature.”); Lee, supra note 43 (“I conceive the
position to be undeniable, that the federal government will be principally in the hands of the
natural aristocracy, and the state governments principally in the hands of the democracy, the
representatives of the body of the people.”).
45. See STORING, supra note 36, at 28; see also Essay by A Farmer, aka Colonel Thomas
Cogswell, Chief Justice of the New Hampshire Court of Common Pleas (1788), in 4 The
Complete Anti-Federalist 207 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“Standing armies are dangerous
in time of peace to the liberties of a free people, provided they are kept and voted their
continuance yearly, they soon get ingrafted into the Constitution, therefore they ought not to
be kept up, on any pretext whatsoever, any longer than till the enemy are driven from our
door.”); Essay by A Farmer, aka Colonel Thomas Cogswell, Chief Justice of the New
Hampshire Court of Common Pleas (1788), in 4 The Complete Anti-Federalist 207 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1981) (“An army either in peace or war, is like the locust and caterpillers [sic]
of Egypt; they bear down all before them—and many times, by designing men, have been
used as an engine to destroy the liberties of people, and reduce them to slavery.”).
46. See STORING, supra note 36, at 28; see also Brutus, Brutus VI, TEACHING AM. HIST.
(Dec. 27, 1787), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/brutus-vi/ (“Upon the whole,
I conceive, that there cannot be a clearer position than this, that the state governments ought
to have an uncontroulable power to raise a revenue, adequate to the exigencies of their
governments; and, I presume, no such power is left them by this constitution.”); Centinel &
Bryan, Centinel II, supra note 44 (“From the foregoing illustration of the powers proposed to
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These varied sources recall for the reader the myriad viewpoints on
ratification of the Constitution, as well as the fear of sweeping new
federal powers under it.47 The anti-federalists thought the new
Constitution would put at risk individual liberties. They believed
smaller, more local government would better protect liberty. They
asserted that the nation was too large for one government to manage the
peculiar regional differences within the country. They feared that the
national government would not maintain a voluntary attachment with the
people and maintain its responsibility to the citizens. They argued that
national officers would act as though they were above the people, and
they would aggrandize power and abuse local interests. Those
viewpoints and that fear of broad federal power remained contested,
be devolved to Congress, it is evident, that the general government would necessarily
annihilate the particular governments, and that the security of the personal rights of the people
by the state constitutions is superseded and destroyed; hence results the necessity of such
security being provided for by a bill of rights to be inserted in the new plan of federal
government.”); Bryan, Centinel V, supra note 36 (“Whatever law-congress may deem
necessary and proper for carrying into execution any of the powers vested in them, may be
enacted; and by virtue of this clause, they may controul and abrogate any and every of the
laws of the state governments, on the allegation that they interfere with the execution of any
of their powers, and yet these law will ‘be made in pursuance of the constitution,’ and of
course will ‘be the supreme law of the land . . . .’ ” ); Cincinnatus, Cincinnatus II: To James
Wilson, Esquire, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Nov. 8, 1787), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/
document/cincinnatus-ii-to-james-wilson-esquire/ (“Thus this new system, with one sweeping
clause, bears down every constitution in the union, and establishes its arbitrary doctrines,
supreme and paramount to all the bills and declarations of rights, in which we vainly put our
trust, and on which we rested the security of our often declared, unalienable liberties.”);
Richard Henry Lee, Federal Farmer XVII, TEACHING AM. HIST. (Jan. 23, 1788),
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/federal-farmer-xvii/
(“A
government
possessed of more power than its constituent parts will justify, will not only probably abuse
it, but be unequal to bear its own burden; it may as soon be destroyed by the pressure of power,
as languish and perish for want of it.”); John DeWitt, John DeWitt II, TEACHING AM. HIST.
(Oct. 27, 1787), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/john-dewitt-ii/ (“That
insatiable thirst for unconditional controul over our fellow-creatures, and the facility of sounds
to convey essentially different ideas, produced the first Bill of Rights ever prefixed to a Frame
of Government.”); An Old Whig I, TEACHING. AM. HIST. (Oct. 12, 1787),
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/an-old-whig-i/ (“The great, and the wise, and
the mighty will be in possession of places and offices; they will oppose all changes in favor
of liberty; they will steadily pursue the acquisition of more and more power to themselves and
their adherents.”); An Old Whig II, TEACHING. AM. HIST. (Oct. 17, 1787),
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/an-old-whig-ii/ (“[I]f I am right in my opinion,
the new constitution vests Congress with such unlimited powers as ought never to be entrusted
to any men or body of men.”); An Old Whig II, supra (“My object is to consider that undefined,
unbounded, and immense power which is comprised in the [Necessary and Proper Clause]
. . . . What limits are there to their authority?—I fear none at all [outside of force] . . . . [W]ho
can overrule their pretensions?-No one; unless we had a bill of rights to which we might
appeal, and under which we might contend against any assumption of undue power and appeal
to the judicial branch of the government to protect us by their judgements.” (emphasis
omitted)).
47. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
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despite ratification. A central claim of this Article is that one finds many
echoes of anti-federalist concerns in recent Supreme Court opinions, but
those writing for the Court do not cite their ideological heirs. It is to the
question of the nature of the limits of federal legislative power that we
turn to in the next two parts of this Article.
III. MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON FEDERAL
POWER
Long before John Marshall was appointed Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and before he wrote landmark opinions in Marbury v.
Madison,48 McCulloch v. Maryland,49 and Gibbons v. Ogden,50 he had
published many of his views on the new Constitution. Marshall’s
extensive papers confirm that he was an unapologetic friend of the new
Constitution and an advocate for increased federal power.51 Among
Marshall’s papers, one finds speeches, personal correspondence, and
published writings calling out the anti-federal spirit in Virginia and
elsewhere.52 Here, the focus is on Marshall’s speeches during the
Virginia Ratifying Convention and related correspondence, then on
Marshall’s leading judicial opinions on the nature of federal power.
A. Marshall’s Speeches and Correspondence
During the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Marshall made a series
of speeches and wrote correspondence to colleagues from which it is
clear that he was a critic of the Articles of Confederation and a fierce
advocate for increased federal power set forth in the Constitution.53
Excerpts of those speeches and writings are set out here to illuminate
Marshall’s views on the Constitution and the nature of federal powers.
They also make it easier for the reader to distinguish Marshallian
federalism from the anti-federalist views of more recent Justices
examined in Parts IV and V of this Article. Occasionally, emphasis is
added to highlight key aspects of Marshallian federalism.
48. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (holding it was the province and duty
of the judicial department to declare what the Constitution means and that the original
jurisdiction of the Court could not be altered by statute).
49. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
50. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
51. See 1 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 1775-1788 (Charles F. Hobson ed., Univ. of
Va. Press digital ed. 2014). While the collection contains many documents, only a small
minority pertain to information regarding Marshall’s views on federalism—or his political
ideology at large: speeches during the Virginia Ratifying Convention and the Friend of the
Constitution essays.
52. See id.
53. See id.
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June 10, 1788 Speech54
The Confederation has nominal powers, but no means to carry them
into effect. If a system of Government were devised by more than
human intelligence, it would not be effectual if the means were not
adequate to the power. All delegated powers are liable to be abused.
Arguments drawn from this source go in direct opposition to every
Government, and in recommendation of anarchy. The friends of the
Constitution are as tenacious of liberty as its enemies. They wish to
give no power that will endanger it. They wish to give the
Government powers to secure and protect it. Our enquiry here must
be, whether the power of taxation be necessary to perform the objects
of the Constitution, and whether it be safe and as well guarded as
human wisdom can do it.55








The objects of the national government:56
o To protect the United States
o Promote the general welfare
o Protection in time of war
“The prosperity and happiness of the people depend on the
performance of these great and important duties of the
General Government.”57
Only the national government, not a singular State, can
perform these duties.58
If we do not give the power to tax to the national
government now, we will do so with “an unsparing hand”
when the dangers of war arrive.59
“We are told, that the Confederation carried us through the
war. Had not the enthusiasm of liberty inspired us with
unanimity, that system would never have carried us
through it. It would have been much sooner terminated had
that Government been possessed of due energy. The
inability of Congress, and the failure of the States to
comply with the Constitutional requisitions, rendered our
resistance less efficient than it might have been. The
weakness of that Government caused troops to be against
us which ought to be on our side, and prevented all the

54. John Marshall, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 10, 1788), in 1
THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 1775-1788, supra note 51, at 256–270.
55. Id. at 260.
56. Id. at 260–61.
57. Id. at 261.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 262.
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resources of the community from being called at once into
action. The extreme readiness of the people to make their
utmost exertions to ward off the pressing danger, supplied
the place of requisitions. When they came solely to be
depended on, their inutility was fully discovered.”60
“I shall not go to the various checks of the Government, but
examine whether the immediate representation of the
people be well constructed. I conceive its organization to
be sufficiently satisfactory to the warmest friend of
freedom.”61
“If any thing be necessary, it must be so, to call forth the
strength of the Union, when we may be attacked, or when
the general purposes of America require it.”62
I think the virtue and talents of the members of the General
Government will tend to the security, instead of the
destruction of our liberty. I think that the power of direct
taxation is essential to the existence of the General
Government, and that it is safe to grant it. If this power be
not necessary, and as safe from abuse as any delegated
power can possibly be, then I say, that the plan before you
is unnecessary; for it imports not what system we have,
unless it have the power of protecting us in time of peace
and war.63

June 20, 1788 Speech64
Has the Government of the United States power to make laws on
every subject?—Does he understand it so?—Can they make laws
affecting the mode of transferring property, or contracts, or claims
between citizens of the same State? Can they go beyond the
delegated powers? If they were to make a law not warranted by any
of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the Judges as
an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard:—They
would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction.—
They would declare it void.65

60. Marshall, supra note 54, at 262.
61. Id. at 264.
62. Id. at 269.
63. Id. at 270.
64. John Marshall, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), in 1
THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 1775–1788, supra note 51, at 275-84.
65. Id. at 276-77 (emphasis added to note that C. J. Roberts referred to this statement in
Sebelius).
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“The Federal Government has no other motive, and has every reason of
doing right, which the Members of our State Legislature have.”66
Letter to Augustine Davis dated October 16, 179367
Remember my countrymen, that the government of the United States
is created by yourselves, that those who fill its great departments are
chosen by yourselves, that they are your friends, and not your
enemies, that their measures must be intended to benefit, and not to
injure you.68

Letter to Augustine Davis dated November 20, 179369
The two great revolutions of 1776 and 1788 are spoken of as cases
where an appeal was made to the people, and the subjects proposed
to them deliberately discussed, and I think wisely decided on. By
whom were those appeals made? By whom were they prosecuted?
By whom and by what were they or could they be supported? What
interests or what motives did or could lead us to either important
crisis and conduct us through it? The first was the united voice and
united strength of America, appealing to the supreme director of all
human affairs against foreign oppression. The second was the
deliberate consultation of the people of America among themselves,
unimpelled by foreigners, unsupported by foreign influence, foreign
interests, or foreign force, on a subject uninteresting to them, but all
important to us. It was the deliberate exercise of American wisdom,
for the purpose of correcting those defects which experience had
marked in our ancient system. In this there was and can be no danger
while we exclude foreign influence. In such a case, whatever
difference of opinion might prevail, there can be but one party, and
that is the people of America; there can be but one object, and that is
the happiness of our common country; there can be but one power
exerted to produce or conduct us through the crisis, and that is the
power of reason exerted in and on the American mind.70

66. Id. at 285.
67. John Marshall, Letter to Augustine Davis (Oct. 16 1793), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL 1788-1795, at 221-28 (Charles F. Hobson ed., Univ. of Va. Press digital ed. 2014).
68. Id. at 228.
69. John Marshall, Letter to Augustine Davis (Nov. 20, 1793), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL 1788-1795, supra note 67, at 238-47.
70. Id. at 246.
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To a Freeholder printed in the Virginia Herald dated September 20,
179871
“I consider that constitution as the rock of our political salvation,
which has preserved us from misery, division and civil wars;—and
which will yet preserve us if we value it rightly and support it firmly.” 72
Letter to Timothy Pickering (U.S. Secretary of State) dated October 15,
179873
“In consequence of this the whole malignancy of Antifederalism,
not only in the district where it unfortunately is but too abundant, but
throughout the state, has become uncommonly active & considers itself
as peculiarly interested in the reelection of the old member.”74
Letter to St. George Tucker dated November 27, 180075
My own opinion is that our ancestors brought with them the laws of
England both statute & common law as existing at the settlement of
each colony, so far as they were applicable to our situation. That on
our revolution the preexisting law of each state remained so far as it
was not changed either expressly or necessarily by the nature of the
governments which we adopted.
That on adopting the existing constitution of the United States the
common & statute law of each state remained as before & that the
principles of the common law of the state would apply themselves to
magistrates of the general as well as to magistrates of the particular
government.76

As a Federalist, Marshall believed a larger republic was better for
national defense and to adjudicate and resolve conflicts within and
among the states. Marshall’s speech indicates that he thought it would
best advance common national interests, tranquility, and peace. He
understood that, at times, state leaders might act against national
interests. He argued that the national government would best promote
economic prosperity. For these and other reasons, he supported the new
Constitution and its expansion of federal powers.

71. John Marshall, Letter to a Freeholder (Sept. 20, 1798), in 3 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL 1796-1798, at 503-06 (Charles F. Hobson ed., Univ. of Va. Press digital ed. 2014).
72. Id. at 504.
73. John Marshall, Letter to Timothy Pickering (Oct. 15, 1798), in 3 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL 1796-1798, supra note 71, at 516-17.
74. Id. at 516.
75. John Marshall, Letter to St. George Tucker (Nov. 27, 1800), in 6 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL 1800-1807, at 23-24 (Charles F. Hobson ed., Univ. of Va. Press digital ed.
2014).
76. Id. at 24.
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B. Marshall, the Supreme Court and Expansive Federal Power
In Marbury v. Madison,77 the landmark case which the Supreme
Court might have dismissed quickly solely on jurisdictional grounds,
with little elaboration, Chief Justice Marshall took the occasion to
explicate an expansive federal judicial review power, declaring that
when reviewing conflicts between the political branches and the
provisions of the Constitution, “[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to declare what the law is.”78 Even
though such an expansive judicial review power is not obvious from the
text of the Constitution, it is today an unquestioned cornerstone of
American constitutional law. Thereafter, Marshall used the same
federalist interpretive brush to declare the broad nature of federal
legislative power and to announce the Doctrine of Implied Powers in
McCulloch v. Maryland.79
McCulloch arose when President Madison allowed the charter of
the First Bank of the United States to expire in 1811.80 The War of 1812
showed the need for such a bank, and Madison supported the creation of
the Second Bank in 1816.81 Many states, however, opposed the new
bank and began passing laws taxing the federal bank by requiring notes
to be printed on stamped paper bought from the state.82 Maryland
attempted to enforce its law against McCulloch, a cashier at the
Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States (“the Bank”), and fine
him for distributing bank notes without the requisite stamps.83 The
Maryland courts ruled in favor of the state, and the case was appealed to
the Supreme Court.84

77. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
78. Id. at 177 (“Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each.”).
79. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
80. First Bank of United States Chartered, LIBR. OF CONG., https://guides.loc.gov/thismonth-in-business-history/february/first-bank-united-states-chartered (last visited Sep. 17,
2022); The chartering of the First Bank was debated at length by Hamilton and Jefferson.
Many of the arguments advanced in McCulloch borrow from those put forth at that time. See
Jefferson’s Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank: 1791, YALE L. SCH.: THE
AVALON
PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/bank-tj.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2022) (citing ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES
MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST: A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Henry Holt & Company 1898)).
81. Andrew T. Hill, The Second Bank of the United States 1816-1841, FED. RSRV. HIST.
(Dec. 5, 2015), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/second-bank-of-the-us.
82. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1819).
83. Id. at 318-19.
84. Id. at 317.
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1. Marshall on the Nature of Federal Powers
Counsel for Maryland made two main arguments.85 First, Congress
was limited to its enumerated powers and there was no power to charter
a bank.86 Second, they argued that Maryland had the power to tax the
federal bank notes.87 The Marshall Court rejected both arguments.88 In
unequivocal language, Marshall explained that federal legislative power
had no limits except those set out in the Constitution:
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of
mankind, we might expect it would be this-that the government of
the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere
of action. This would seem to result, necessarily, from its nature. It
is the government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it represents
all, and acts for all. Though any one state may be willing to control
its operations, no state is willing to allow others to control them. The
nation, on those subjects on which it can act, must necessarily bind
its component parts. But this question is not left to mere reason: the
people have, in express terms, decided it, by saying, ‘this
constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made
in pursuance thereof,’ ‘shall be the supreme law of the land,’ and by
requiring that the members of the state legislatures, and the officers
of the executive and judicial departments of the states, shall take the
oath of fidelity to it. The government of the United States, then,
though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in
pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land,
‘anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.’89
Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing a
bank or creating a corporation. But there is no phrase in the
instrument which, like the articles of confederation, excludes
incidental or implied powers; and which requires that everything
granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the 10th
amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the
excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word
‘expressly,’ and declares only, that the powers ‘not delegated to the
United States, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states
or to the people;’ thus leaving the question, whether the particular
power which may become the subject of contest, has been delegated
to the one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair
construction of the whole instrument. The men who drew and
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 405-06.
Id.
Id.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405-06.
Id. (emphasis added).
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adopted this amendment had experienced the embarrassments
resulting from the insertion of this word in the articles of
confederation, and probably omitted it, to avoid those
embarrassments. A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all
the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the
means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake
of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by
the human mind. It would, probably, never be understood by the
public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines
should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor
ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the
nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by
the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred
from the nature of the instrument, but from the language. Then, we
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.90
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are
limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think
the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national
legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the
powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable
that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner
most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.91

2. The Arguments in McCulloch v. Maryland
Daniel Webster argued the case for McCulloch along with William
Pinkney and Attorney General William Wirt.92 Both Webster and Wirt
began by arguing that the Bank’s constitutionality should not be
considered an open question.93 Webster argued that it had been decided
by the First Congress and cited Hamilton: “The arguments drawn from
the constitution in favour of this power, were stated, and exhausted, in
that discussion. They were exhibited, with characteristic perspicuity and
force, by the first Secretary of the Treasury, in his report to the President

90. Id. at 406-07 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 322; McCulloch v. Maryland, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/17891850/17us316 (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
93. Summary of Oral Argument at 322, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819),
reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 108 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1978).
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of the United States.”94 The enactment of the Bank by the first Congress,
and subsequent legislative, executive, and judicial acceptance of this act,
should allow it to stand, “unless its repugnancy with the constitution
were plain and manifest.”95 Marshall tracked this language fairly closely
when he stated that a “bold and daring usurpation” of the Constitution
would not be suffered, but that historical decisions by the legislature
“ought not to be lightly disregarded.”96
Luther Martin, Joseph Hopkinson, and Walter Jones represented
Maryland. 97 On the question of the longstanding acceptance of the
Bank, Jones simply argued that its constitutionality had not been tried
before the Court.98 Hopkinson sidestepped this question, arguing that it
had long “divided the opinions of the first men of our country.”99 He
argued that even if it had been constitutional in 1791, the Bank was no
longer constitutional because it was no longer necessary due to the
expansion of private banks in the country.100 In other words, Hopkinson
jumped directly to the Necessary and Proper Clause and his reading of it
matched that of Jefferson: Congress may only create a Bank if doing so
is indispensably necessary to carrying out its delegated powers.101 He
used Hamilton’s policy arguments in favor of the Bank to argue that it
had been much more necessary in 1791, but was no longer needed.102
In addition to the historical argument mentioned above, Webster
presented a justification for the Bank that did not rely on the Necessary
and Proper Clause, saying: “Even without the aid of the general clause
in the constitution, empowering Congress to pass all necessary and
proper laws for carrying its powers into execution, the grant of powers
itself necessarily implies the grant of all usual and suitable means for the
execution of the powers granted.”103
There is some evidence that counsel for Maryland conceded that
some powers can be implied from the grants of powers themselves, such
as the power to coin money implies that to create a mint.104 However,
that did not mean that Congress had a choice of any legitimate means;
rather Walter Jones argued that “[t]here is an obvious distinction
94. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 323.
95. Id. at 323.
96. Id. at 401.
97. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 330; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 92
(indicating which counsel argued for Maryland).
98. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 331.
99. Id. at 331.
100. Id. at 332-33.
101. Id. at 331.
102. Id. at 332-33.
103. Id. at 323-24.
104. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 365.
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between those means which are incidental to the particular power, which
follow as a corollary from it and those which may be arbitrarily assumed
as convenient to the execution of the power, or usurped under the pretext
of necessity.”105
On the other hand, Luther Martin argued for Maryland that the
grants of power themselves demonstrate that the Framers intended to
“leave nothing to implication.”106 For example, the power to declare war
might fairly imply the power to raise armies, maintain a Navy, and raise
revenue to prosecute the war, but the Constitution removes those powers
from the realm of implication with specific grants.107
A close examination of McCulloch suggests that Marshall agreed
with Webster’s (and Hamilton’s) expansive reading of the federal power.
Marshall began by acknowledging Webster’s argument that the question
involved here had been long-discussed and had been resolved in the
affirmative by the legislature on more than one occasion.108
Marshall devoted two-thirds of his opinion to the question of Congress’
power to create the Bank, indicating that the scope of national legislative
power was the important question for him.109 In addressing the idea that
the government is one of enumerated powers, Marshall also referred to
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.110 He argued that “the
government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within
its sphere of action,” and later that it is not necessary to prove this point
because the Constitution declares it in the plain language of the
Supremacy Clause.111
Marshall contrasted the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution with
a similar provision found in the Articles of Confederation, noting that
the former omitted the word “expressly” in describing powers granted to
the central government.112 He believed it to be an intentional omission,
arguing that the “embarrassments” of the Articles caused the Framers to
change the wording of the provision.113 Marshall did not find any
compelling argument for the state in the fact that the government is one
of delegated powers.114

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 373.
Id.
Id. at 401.
See id. at 401-25.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405-06.
Id.
Id. at 406-07.
Id.
Id.
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Marshall next turned to the central question: do the granted powers
in the Constitution carry other implied powers with them? In order to
answer this question, he first made the structural argument that a
constitution cannot specify in detail all the powers it grants without
assuming the complexity of a legal code.115 Marshall noted, “[w]e must
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”116 Marshall
read the great outlines of the Constitution to include implied powers. He
thought that a government entrusted with such powers must also be
entrusted with ample means to execute them.117
Embracing the views of Webster and Hamilton, Marshall believed
that the choice of means in executing the granted powers lay with the
legislature, thus rejecting Martin’s contention that the Constitution’s
mention of some means precludes Congress from using others.118
Marshall then demonstrated that the creation of a corporation did not
represent an end in itself, but was simply a means.119 Since Congress
must have a choice of means to carry its granted powers into effect,
Congress should have the power to erect a corporation.120 The burden
of proving a corporation was somehow different from other means lay
with Maryland, and it failed to meet its burden.121 Marshall concluded,
“No sufficient reason is, therefore, perceived, why it may not pass as
incidental to those powers which are expressly given, if it be a direct
mode of executing them.”122 Thus, even before Marshall turned his
analysis to the Necessary and Proper Clause, I would argue that he had
decided the question of implied federal legislative powers. That is,
through general reasoning about the nature of the Constitution and of
federal power, the Court would likely have supported Congress’ power
to enact the Bank Act.
Even if the Court’s discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause
was not essential to the Court’s holding, that discussion illustrates that
Marshall believed the Clause further supported the constitutionality of
the Bank Act. Marshall stated that, “[T]he constitution of the United
States has not left the right of Congress to employ the necessary means,
for the execution of the powers conferred on the government, to general

115. Id. at 407.
116. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407.
117. Id. at 407-08.
118. Id. at 408; Transcript of Oral Argument, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819),
1819 U.S. LEXIS 320, at 79-80.
119. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 409.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 409-10.
122. Id. at 411.
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reasoning.”123 Marshall rejected arguments by Maryland that the Clause
should be read as a restriction of federal power.124 For Marshall, such a
reading would “almost annihilate this useful and necessary right of the
legislature to select its means.”125
Marshall set forth two reasons why “necessary” should be read
expansively.126 First, Article I of the Constitution contains a list of
powers granted to the Congress and a list of things it may not do; the
Necessary and Proper Clause is grouped with the former rather than with
the latter. In Marshall’s words, it is placed among the powers, rather
than among the limitations on power.127 Second, Marshall argued that
the Clause itself “purports” to enlarge the powers of Congress and to be
an additional grant, rather than a limitation.128 If the Framers had meant
to use those words to diminish congressional power, they would have
made this very clear, because, as Marshall argued, the Constitution
“would be endangered by its strength, not by its weakness.”129
Marshall concluded:
The result of the most careful and attentive consideration bestowed
upon this clause is, that if it does not enlarge, it cannot be construed
to restrain the powers of Congress, or to impair the right of the
legislature to exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures
to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the
government.130

Marshall held that the Necessary and Proper Clause could not restrict the
power of Congress, and that, in fact, necessity is simply not an issue for
the courts; it should be debated in Congress, if anywhere.131 The
remainder of Marshall’s McCulloch opinion concerned the right of the
Bank to establish a branch in Maryland, and the state’s ability to tax it;
however, that is not central to this Article.132
What is relevant is the substantial criticism leveled against the
McCulloch opinion and Marshall’s published essays defending
McCulloch.
Marshall wrote a series of A Friend of the
123. Id.
124. Id. at 412.
125. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 419.
126. Id. at 419-20.
127. Id. at 419.
128. Id. at 420.
129. Id. at 420.
130. Id.
131. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421-23.
132. See id. The vigorous anti-federalist response to the McCulloch opinion is beyond the
scope of this Article, but see for reference R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall, McCulloch v.
Maryland, and the Southern States’ Rights Tradition, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 875, 876
(2000).
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Union/Constitution essays defending McCulloch and his views on the
nature of federal legislative power.133
Marshall’s speeches,
133. John Marshall, Marshall’s “A Friend of the Constitution” Essays, in JOHN
MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 155, 155-214 (Gerald Gunther ed.,
1969). See generally 1 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 1775-1788, supra note 51. While
the collection contains many documents, only a small minority pertain to information
regarding Marshall’s views on federalism—or his political ideology at large: speeches during
the Virginia Ratifying Convention and the Friend of the Constitution essays.
Editorial Note on Essays Defending McCulloch v. Maryland:
Although the Chief Justice provided sufficient clues in his correspondence, for years
biographers and other scholars had failed to uncover the full dimensions of Marshall’s
counterattack. Then in 1969 Professor Gerald Gunther published the results of his research in
preparing a history of the Marshall Court. Gunther was the first to make the connection
between Marshall’s comments in letters to Bushrod Washington and Joseph Story and the
publication of a dozen essays (now known to have been written by Marshall) in an Alexandria,
Virginia, newspaper. Previous to Gunther’s discoveries, Marshall was thought to have written
only two pieces in defense of McCulloch, the two numbers of “A Friend to the Union,”
published in the Philadelphia Union in April 1819.
This publication was so hopelessly botched, however, that the Chief Justice arranged
to have the essays reprinted in Alexandria. See also, John Marshall’s Defense of McCulloch
v. Maryland 190-191, (G. Gunther ed. 1969). Gunther’s research in the files of the Gazette
and Alexandria Daily Advertiser unearthed not only the reprinting of “A Friend to the Union”
(now divided into three numbers instead of two) but also nine previously unknown essays
written by Marshall under the nom de plume “A Friend of the Constitution.”
 Throughout April Ritchie directed a steady barrage of articles and editorials opposing
the bank opinion. Marshall began writing “A Friend to the Union” soon after
reading Amphictyon’s critique, motivated by his growing apprehension that the
animosity generated by McCulloch was merely the entering wedge of a broader
assault on the Constitution and the Union itself, aimed at the government’s
“weakest department,” the federal judiciary. His overriding fear was that the
unleashing of the “antifederal spirit of Virginia,” which had been agitating with
increasing fury since Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee in 1816, would produce defiant
resolutions by the Virginia General Assembly similar to those of 1798 and 1799.
The consequence might be the emasculation of the Supreme Court and other
measures that would effectively dismantle the federal government. If the principles
of “the democracy in Virginia” prevailed, he fretted, “the constitution would be
converted into the old confederation.” Indeed, Hampden would soon confirm
Marshall’s suspicions by claiming that the present general government was “as
much a federal government, or a ‘league,’ as was the former confederation.”
 The essential charge against McCulloch was that it manifested a sinister design to
overthrow the Constitution, prostrate the rights of the states and the people, and
establish a consolidated general government of unlimited powers—confirming the
worst fears voiced by Anti-federalists in 1788 and Republicans in the crisis of 1798
and 1799. This “warfare” against the states and people, heretofore carried on with
varying success in Congress, was now to be directed by the “bolder” hands of the
federal judiciary, who “by a judicial coup de main” would “give a general letter of
attorney to the future legislators of the union” and “tread under foot” all
constitutional limits upon federal legislative powers. Like John Hampden, the
celebrated seventeenth-century opponent of arbitrary monarchical power, and the
American patriots who resisted the claims of Parliament, Roane would take his
stand as “a freeman” at this present “crisis,” which “portends destruction to the
liberties of the American people.” As Marshall feared, resolutions condemning the
bank decision were introduced in the House of Delegates, the first of which

2022]

FEDERALISM BY DECEPTION

573

correspondences and judicial opinions reflected an unequivocal support
for the constitution and for broad federal legislative powers. Thus, as
this article will later illustrate, it is more than irony when recent Justices
cite Marshall in support of anti-federalist views.
C. Applying the Doctrine of Implied Powers
After vigorously defending McCulloch, Marshall and other Justices
applied the Doctrine of Implied Powers, especially in cases interpreting
the nature of the scope of the Commerce Clause, such as Gibbons v.
Ogden134 and its progeny. The Court there read the Congress’ commerce
power expansively: “The words of the constitution are, ‘Congress shall
have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes.’ ” 135
We are now arrived at the inquiry—What is this power?
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in
Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent,
and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution. These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect
the questions which arise in this case, or which have been discussed
at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of
Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those
objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be
instructed the state’s senators and representatives in Congress to procure a
constitutional amendment creating a separate tribunal for deciding all questions
involving a conflict between the powers of the federal and state governments.
Another instructed them “to resist on every occasion” legislation that attempted to
exercise any power not “expressly given” to the national government or that was
not “necessary and proper,” which phrase was to be construed in the more restricted
sense approved by the state legislature. Following the precedent of 1798 and 1799,
a third resolution requested the governor to transmit copies of these resolutions to
each of the other states. The first resolution was eventually dropped and replaced
by one urging a “declaratory amendment” prohibiting Congress from incorporating
a bank anywhere except in the District of Columbia. As amended, these resolutions
were adopted by a large majority in the House of Delegates. The Senate, however,
“contrary to every expectation,” declined to take up the resolutions, reportedly for
lack of time “to consider and digest” them. “It is with the profoundest regret we
have to give this information,” wrote the disappointed editor of the Enquirer.
134. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). This case concerned a dispute between
steamboat operators, one of whom had an exclusive license from the state of New York, while
the other had a license from the federal government. There were several questions before the
Court, including whether Congress could pass laws on this subject, to what extent States may
also regulate, and what happens when the regulations come into conflict with one another.
The author reads Gibbons to define the federal commerce power broadly, consistent with the
Doctrine of Implied Powers.
135. Id. at 226.
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in a single government, having in its constitution the same
restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the
constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of
Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which
their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other
instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints
on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are
the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all
representative governments.136

As Marshall had done in Marbury for federal judicial review, and
in McCulloch for the nature of federal legislative power, Marshall’s
Gibbons analysis gave an expansive reading of federal legislative power
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.137 That view would predominate
throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries until new,
unenumerated implied limits on federal legislative power were declared
by the Court.
Ultimately, Marshall correctly predicted that the scope of the
federal legislative power would continue to be challenged. “[T]he
question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is
perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise as long as our
system shall exist.”138 Since McCulloch, the Supreme Court has
inconsistently described the nature of limits on federal legislative power.
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED LIMITS ON FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE
POWER
In a series of cases decided over the past half-century, the Court has
announced unenumerated, implied limits on federal legislative power,
reversing Marshallian federalism and declaring that Congress may act
only if the Constitution first grants it the authority to act. According to
this view, Congress’ powers are written, enumerated, and limited. All
others are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.139 The
Court demonstrated its reversal of Marshallian federalism through its
decisions in a string of Tenth Amendment cases, as well as its more
recent decision in NFIB v. Sebelius.

136.
137.
138.
139.
(2012).

Id. at 196-97 (emphasis added).
See id. at 1.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).
U.S. CONST. amend. X; Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 534
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A. The Anti-Federal Tenth Amendment
Between 1937 and the 1990s there was only one case where a
federal law was struck down as exceeding Congress’ Commerce Clause
power. In National League of Cities v. Usery,140 the Court held that the
application of minimum wage requirements of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to state and municipal employees was unconstitutional.141 The Court
wrote that “Congress may not exercise its power to regulate commerce
so as to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential
decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are
to be made.”142 That departure from precedent was short-lived and
expressly overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.143
1. Garcia v. San Antonio
In Garcia, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, criticized
previous attempts “to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity
in terms of ‘traditional governmental functions’ is not only unworkable
but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism . . . .”144
The Court itself had had trouble defining the scope of “governmental
functions” deemed protected and doubted whether the Court would ever
be able to develop a workable standard:145
The problem is that neither the governmental/propriety distinction
nor any other that purports to separate out important governmental
functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic
society. The essence of our federal system is that within the realm
of authority left open to them under the Constitution, the States must
be equally free to engage in any activity that their citizens choose for
the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone
else . . . deems [it] to be. Any rule of state immunity . . . inevitably
invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which
state policies it favors and which one it dislikes. . . . [T]he States
cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment . . . .
....

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Id. at 855.
See id.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Id. at 531.
See id. at 540.
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. . . If there are to be limits on the Federal Government’s power to
interfere with state functions – as undoubtedly there are – we must
look elsewhere to find them.146

Next, the Court addressed the nature of the limits on federal power: “The
central theme of National League of Cities was that the States occupy a
special position in our constitutional system and that the scope of
Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect that
position.”147 Unfortunately, the language of the Commerce Clause itself
does not provide any specific limitation on Congress’s actions in dealing
with the States. “What has proved problematic is not the perception that
the Constitution’s federal structure imposes limitations on the
Commerce Clause, but rather the nature and content of those
limitations.”148
The Garcia majority did not dispute that states retain some
sovereignty.149 Instead, they argued that the sovereignty of the states is
limited by the Constitution itself.150 While the majority conceded that
“[t]he States unquestionably do ‘retain a significant measure of
sovereign authority,’ ” the majority reasoned that they do so “only to the
extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original
powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government.”151
Except for a few rare exceptions, “the Constitution does not carve out
express elements of state sovereignty that Congress may not employ its
delegated powers to displace.”152 “[T]he fact that the States remain
sovereign as to all powers not vested in Congress or denied them by the
Constitution offers no guidance about where the frontier between state
and federal power lies.”153
The majority continued, “When we look for the States’ ‘residuary
and inviolable sovereignty,’ in the shape of the constitutional scheme
rather than in predetermined notions of sovereign power, a different
measure of state sovereignty emerges.”154 “[T]he principal means
chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal
system lies in the structure of the Federal Government . . . .”155 The
Framers gave the states a role in the selection both of the Executive and
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 545-47.
Id. at 547.
Id.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549.
Id. at 549.
Id.
Id. at 550.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550.
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Legislative branches of the federal government.156 Citing Madison, the
Court concluded that the federal government is supposed to “partake
sufficiently of the spirit [of the States], to be disinclined to invade the
rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their
governments. . . . [T]he residuary sovereignty of the States [is] implied
and secured by that principle of representation . . . .”157 The states’
interests are protected not by judicially created limitations on federal
power, but by the structure of the federal system.158 “Any substantive
restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its
justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must
be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political
process rather than to dictate a ‘sacred province of state autonomy.’ ” 159
The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the states will
not be enacted.160
Justice Powell, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O’Connor had
a different opinion about the nature of power reserved to the states and
criticized the Court’s abrupt reversal of National League of Cities:
In the present cases, the five Justices, who compose the majority
today participated in National League of Cities and the cases
reaffirming it. The stability of judicial decision, and with it respect
for the authority for this Court, are not served by the precipitate
overruling of multiple precedents that we witness in these cases.
Whatever effect the Court’s decision may have in weakening the
application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less important than what
the Court has done to the Constitution itself. 161

The dissenters continued, “[d]espite some genuflecting in the
Court’s opinion to the concept of federalism, today’s decision effectively
reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric when Congress
acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause.”162 The majority was concerned
with National League of Cities because it “invites an unelected federal
judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and
which ones it dislikes,”163 however, Justice Powell noted:
[T]hat it does not seem to have occurred to the Court that it—an
unelected majority of five Justices—today rejects almost 200 years
156. Id. at 551; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
157. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551-52 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 332 (James Madison)
(B. Wright ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 7, at 408 (James Madison)).
158. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
159. Id. at 554.
160. Id. at 556.
161. Id. at 559-60 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
162. Id. 560.
163. Id.
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of the understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited in
support of the view that the role of the States in the federal system
may depend upon the grace of elected federal officials, rather than
on the Constitution as interpreted by this Court.164

In the Garcia dissent, there are significant echoes of anti-federalist
thought on opposition to the Constitution and about the primary role of
the states in our federal system: Garcia does not explain how “the States’
role in the electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual state
sovereignty.”165 Also, although members of Congress are elected from
the states, once elected, they become members of the federal
government, implying those representatives no longer represent the
interests of the state.166 Again, that sentiment arose in the anti-federalist
writings. Likewise, even though the states participate in the election of
the President, this is hardly a reason to view the President “as a
representative of the States’ interest against federal encroachment.”167
For the dissenters, nothing in the electoral process prevents Congress
from invoking unlimited powers under the Commerce Clause.168 “The
States’ role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional law,
not of legislative grace.”169 Anti-federalists feared that national officers
would aggrandize and abuse their powers at the expense of locals.170
“More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court’s reasoning is
the result of its holding . . . that federal political officials, invoking the
Commerce Clause, are the sole judges of the limits of their own
power.”171
The dissenters argued that the Tenth Amendment was adopted
specifically to ensure the role of the states.172 They conceded that
opponents to the Constitution feared that the national government would
become too powerful and eventually eliminate the states as political
entities.173 This concern resulted in the Bill of Rights, including a
provision reserving powers to the states.174 “[H]istory, which the Court
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560-61 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 564.
Id. at 564-65.
Id. at 565.
Id.
Id. at 567.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id.
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simply ignores, documents the integral role of the Tenth Amendment in
our constitutional theory.”175 “[B]y usurping functions traditionally
performed by the States, federal overreaching under the Commerce
Clause undermines the constitutionally mandated balance of power
between the States and the Federal Government, a balance designed to
protect our fundamental liberties.”176
The dissenters thought federal commerce power was limited; the
states retained power to regulate that commerce not within the federal
sphere.177 Yet, that interpretation was not the prevailing view of the
commerce power for significant portions of the Court’s history. The
language of the Clause focuses on activities that only the federal
government could regulate: commerce with foreign nations and Indian
tribes and among the several states.178
[T]his Court has construed the Commerce Clause to accommodate
unanticipated changes over the past two centuries. As these changes
have occurred, the Court has had to decide whether the Federal
Government has exceeded its authority by regulating activities
beyond the capability of a single State to regulate or beyond
legitimate federal interests that outweighed the authority and
interests of the States.179

The dissenters argued that the Court’s opinion in National League of
Cities was faithful to the historical understanding of federalism.180
Powell’s dissent was blistering, invoking broad principles of state
sovereignty: The majority in Garcia failed to recognize the broad, yet
specific, areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the states to
hold.181 Garcia adopts an unprecedented view that “Congress is free
under the Commerce Clause to assume a State’s traditional sovereign
power, and to do so without judicial review of its action.”182 Activities
mentioned in National League of Cities, like fire prevention, police
protection, sanitation, and public health, are remote from any normal
concept of interstate commerce, yet Garcia allowed the federal
government to exercise its control over those areas under the guise of the
Commerce Clause.183

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 570.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 572 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id.
Id.
Id. at 573.
Id.
See id. at 573.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 575 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented separately to point out that
National League of Cities recognized that Congress “could not act under
its commerce power to infringe on certain fundamental aspects of state
sovereignty that are essential to ‘the States’ separate and independent
existence.”184 Rehnquist distinguished Powell and O’Connor’s view
from Justice Blackmun’s, when he spoke of a type of balancing approach
where federal power would not be outlawed in areas “where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater . . . .”185
Justice O’Connor also dissented to articulate her views on
federalism and state sovereignty, “to note [] fundamental disagreement
with the majority’s views of federalism and the duty of this Court.”186
O’Connor argued that there was “more to federalism than the nature of
the constraints that can be imposed on the States in ‘the realm of
authority left open to them by the Constitution.’ ” 187
For O’Connor, the central issue of federalism is instead whether
any realm is left open to the state—whether any area remains in which a
state may act free of federal interference.188 “The true ‘essence’ of
federalism is that the States as States have legitimate interests which the
National Government is bound to respect even though its laws are
supreme.”189 Here, Justice O’Connor does not cite constitutional
authority for this limit on federal power.190 It is an unenumerated,
implied limitation based on her interpretation of what the Framers
envisioned. For O’Connor, the Framers envisioned a national
government able to solve national problems, but also intended a
Republic whose vitality was assured by the balance of power between
the federal government and the states.191 O’Connor concluded that the
Court’s expansive reading of federal commerce power had displaced
traditional federalism.192
Justice O’Connor relied on the Tenth Amendment, which provides
that the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution are
reserved to the States and those powers delegated were intended to be
“few and defined.”193 But, it is clear that the Constitution, in fact,
delegates commerce powers to Congress, which should then make the
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 579 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 580.
Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 581 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 582.
Id. at 582.
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Tenth Amendment wholly inapplicable. To avoid this delegated power
hurdle, O’Connor implies from the Tenth Amendment state sovereignty
principles and unwritten limits on Congress’s delegated powers.
“Because virtually every state activity, like virtually every activity of a
private individual, arguably ‘affects’ interstate commerce, Congress can
now supplant the States from the significant sphere of activities
envisioned for them by the Framers.”194
Here, Justice O’Connor took direct aim at Marshall’s reasoning in
McCulloch, noting that the spirit of the Constitution includes the Tenth
Amendment where the states retain their balance of power.195 “It is not
enough that the ‘end be legitimate’; the means to that end chosen by
Congress must not contravene the spirit of the Constitution.”196 In a
sense, Justice O’Connor reasoned that there are limits on federal
legislative power that arise from the spirit of the Constitution, not its
text. Thus, Congress’ commerce power, while broad, cannot be
exercised without concerns for state autonomy.197
2. Gregory v. Ashcroft
After Garcia, Justice O’Connor and other Justices slowly expanded
the implied limits doctrine, protecting the states as free from federal
intrusion. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court did not use the Tenth
Amendment to invalidate the federal law, but instead used it to frame a
rule of construction.198 The Court held that a federal law imposing a
substantial burden on a state government would only be applied if
Congress clearly indicated that it wanted the law to apply to state
governments.199
Justice O’Connor began by stating that the Constitution
“establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the
Federal Government.”200 The Framers included the Tenth Amendment
to indicate their intention to create a federal government of limited
powers.201 Citing James Madison, she wrote:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in State
governments are numerous and indefinite. . . . The powers reserved
to the several States will extend to the objects which, in the ordinary
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Garcia, 469 U.S. at 584 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
See id. at 585.
Id.
Id.
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
Id. at 473.
Id. at 457.
Id.
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course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State.202

What seemed lost on O’Connor and the majority is the fundamental
transformation of the federalism balance following the Civil War and the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.
She wrote: “The
‘constitutionally mandated balance of power’ between the States and the
Federal Government was adopted by the framers to ensure the protection
of ‘our fundamental liberties.’ ” 203 Of course, this view was a central
claim of the anti-federalists. Just as the separation and independence of
the branches of the federal government prevent an accumulation of
excessive power, separation and independence between the states and
the federal government will reduce the risk of abuse on either front.204 It
was that abuse by the Confederate states that led to new federalist
restrictions on state governments and a fundamentally different balance
of power between the national government and the states following the
ratification of the post-Civil War Amendments.
Notwithstanding her dual sovereignty argument, Justice O’Connor
acknowledged that “[t]he Federal Government holds a decided
advantage in this delicate balance: the Supremacy Clause.”205 “As long
as it is acting within the powers granted it under the Constitution,
Congress may impose its will on the States. Congress may legislate in
areas traditionally regulated by the States.”206 Despite recognizing
Congress’ power, the majority was skeptical that Congress had the
power to override a state constitutional provision through which the
people of Missouri had established a qualification for those who sit as
their judges.207 “Congressional interference with this decision of the
people of Missouri, defining their constitutional officers, would upset
the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.”208
Before the Court can allow Congress to upset the constitutional
balance of federal and state powers, “it is incumbent upon the federal
courts to be certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law
overrides this balance.”209
202. Id. at 458 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
203. Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)); see
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting).
204. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 458.
205. Id. at 460.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
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Congress should make its intention “clear and manifest” if it intends
to pre-empt the historic powers of the States . . . . “In traditionally
sensitive areas, such a legislation affecting the federal balance, the
requirement of a clear statement assures that the legislature has in
fact faced, and intended to bring into issue the critical matters
involved in the judicial decision.”210

The Court determined that absent a clear intent from Congress, it would
not apply the federal age discrimination act to state judges.211 This rule
of construction functioned as an unenumerated, implied limit on federal
legislative power.
3. New York v. United States
In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor used the decision
to identify additional unenumerated limits on federal legislative
power.212 Without directly claiming to overrule Garcia, the Court held
that Congress could regulate the disposal of radioactive waste under the
Commerce Clause, but that it could not do so with its “take title”
provision.213 Justice O’Connor stated that “while Congress has
substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the States to
provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste within their borders, the
Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability to simply compel
the States to do so.”214
As in previous cases, the Court had to determine the constitutional
line between federal and state power.215 Here, O’Connor deployed the
Tenth Amendment directly: if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty
reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is a power that the Constitution
has not conferred on Congress.216 Under this reasoning, an incident of
state sovereignty serves to limit federal legislative power under Article
I.217
O’Connor’s opinion is confusing because she indicates that it is
clear that “[r]egulation of the resulting interstate market in waste
disposal is therefore well within Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause.”218 If that is correct, the Tenth Amendment and

210. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 461 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 65 (1989)).
211. Id. at 473.
212. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
213. See id.
214. Id. at 149.
215. See id. at 155.
216. Id. at 156.
217. See id. at 157.
218. New York, 505 U.S. at 160.
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implied principles of sovereignty should have had no application. If
Congress has power, in its sphere, it is plenary and exercisable to the
utmost extent. Yet, O’Connor sidestepped that logic to reframe the
state’s argument, declaring that the Tenth Amendment implicitly limits
the power of Congress to regulate in the way it has chosen.219 Thus, even
if Congress has regulatory power, it may not use the states as implements
of regulation.220
Justice O’Connor then announced the anti-commandeering
principle: “As an initial matter, Congress may not simply
‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’ ” 221
“While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly,
including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has
never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the
States to govern according to Congress’s instructions.”222
The Court noted that pursuant to its spending power, “Congress
may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds,”223 or may offer
States the choice of regulating an activity according to federal standards
or having state law pre-empted.224 “By either of these methods, as by
any other permissible method of encouraging a State to conform to
federal policy choices, the residents of the State retain the ultimate
decision as to whether or not the State will comply.”225 But to allow the
federal government to dictate how states regulate would cause local and
state officials to bear the brunt of public disapproval, insulating federal
officials from the electoral ramifications of their decisions.226 It is not at
all clear why members of Congress would be shielded from review.
Members must seek re-election. Even more, the textual source for the
anti-commandeering principle is not clear. It appears the Court simply
implied an unenumerated limit, deriving it from general principles of
state sovereignty.
The Court did not invalidate the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy in its entirety as a command to regulate.227 It sustained the

219. Id.
220. Id. at 161.
221. Id. (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264,
288 (1981) (upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act because it did not
“commandeer” the states into regulating mining)).
222. Id. at 162.
223. Id. at 167 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)).
224. New York, 505 U.S. at 167.
225. Id. at 168.
226. Id. at 169.
227. See id. at 170.

2022]

FEDERALISM BY DECEPTION

585

monetary and access incentives as permissible federal action.228 For the
Court, the “take title” provision crossed the line from encouragement to
coercion.229
Because an instruction to state governments to take title to waste,
standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and
because a direct order to regulate, standing alone, would also be
beyond the authority of Congress, it follows that Congress lacks the
power to offer the State a choice between the two.230

“A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory
techniques is no choice at all.”231 “Whether one views the take title
provision as lying outside Congress’s enumerated powers, or as
infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of
our government established by the Constitution.”232 Again, O’Connor
did not argue an explicit textual limit on federal power. She concluded
that the provision was inconsistent with the federal structure established
by the Constitution. I am convinced Chief Justice Marshall would have
disagreed and rejected such implied, unenumerated limits on federal
legislative power.
Justice O’Connor concluded that, “Where a federal interest is
sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so directly;
it may not conscript state governments as its agents.”233 She continued:
States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States. State
governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies
of the Federal Government. The positions occupied by state officials
appear nowhere on the Federal Government’s most detailed
organizational chart. The Constitution instead “leaves to the several
States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,” reserved explicitly to
the States by the Tenth Amendment. Whatever the outer limits of
that sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The Federal Government
may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program. . . . The Constitution enables the Federal Government to
pre-empt state regulation contrary to federal interests, and it permits
the Federal Government to hold out incentives to the States as a
means of encouraging them to adopt the suggested regulatory
schemes.234

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 170-74.
Id. at 174-75.
New York, 505 U.S. at 176.
Id.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 188 (citation omitted).
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Justice White, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens, would have
upheld the take title provision as well as the other federal incentives.235
Justice White argued that the majority mischaracterized factually how
Congress became involved in the waste controversy.236 Congress did not
act unilaterally against the States, but instead was asked by the States to
intervene: “To read the Court’s version of events . . . one would think
that Congress was the sole proponent of a solution to the Nation’s lowlevel radioactive waste problem.”237 But actually, the Act “resulted from
the efforts of state leaders to achieve a state-based set of remedies to the
waste problem. They sought not federal pre-emption or intervention, but
rather congressional sanction of interstate compromises they had
reached.”238 “The distinction is key, and the Court’s failure to properly
characterize this legislation ultimately affects its analysis of the take title
provision’s constitutionality.”239 For the dissenters, “these statutes are
best understood as products of collective state action, rather than as
impositions placed on States by the Federal Government.”240
Justice White was also concerned that New York was seeking to
benefit from the Act at the same time it was refusing to comply with
some of its provisions.241 While making plans to build its own waste
site, New York continued to take advantage of the import concessions
made by the United States by exporting its waste for the full seven-year
extension period.242 “By gaining these benefits and complying with
certain of the 1985 Act’s deadlines, therefore, New York fairly
evidenced its acceptance of the federal-state arrangement . . . .”243 Under
the theory of the majority, state sovereignty principles protected New
York’s choice to go it alone. But the state could not go it alone because
it could not persuade its residents to accept a low-level radioactive waste
site, and New York wanted to continue to send such waste to other
states.244 Must other states accept New York’s waste, even when New
York refuses to join and comply with a compact? The dissenters
concluded no based on the reasoning of Garcia.
The Garcia Court stated the proper inquiry:

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See id. at 189 (White, J., dissenting).
New York, 505 U.S. at 189 (White, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 196.
See id. at 198-99.
New York, 505 U.S. at 198 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199-200.
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[W]e are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect
the “States as States” is one of process rather than one of result. Any
substantive restraint on the exercise of the Commerce Clause powers
must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic
limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings
in the national political process rather than to dictate a “sacred
province of state autonomy.”245

In New York, the political process did not fail. The Governors’
Association requested federal assistance with a thorny issue of concern
to the nation, how to manage growing amounts of low-level radioactive
waste. The national government responded with compromise and
accommodation, only to be told by the Court that it had exceeded its
federal powers.
4. Printz v. United States
The next significant case to embrace the doctrine of implied limits
on federal legislative power was Printz v. United States, where Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act was an unconstitutional commandeering of state
executive officials to implement a federal mandate.246 While the
Government contended some of the earliest enacted statutes required the
participation of state officials in implementation of federal laws,247
Justice Scalia rejected the Government’s position, concluding that such
early laws establish, at most, “that the Constitution was originally
understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to
enforce federal prescriptions . . . .”248
The majority found that the complete lack of statutes imposing
obligations on the States’ executive suggests an “assumed absence of
such power.”249 “Not only do the enactments of the early Congresses
. . . contain no evidence of an assumption that the Federal Government
may command the States’ executive power in the absence of a
particularized constitutional authorization, they contain some indication
245. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985); see also New
York, 505 U.S. at 211 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The notion that
Congress does not have the power to issue ‘a simple command to state governments to
implement legislation enacted by Congress’ is incorrect and unsound. There is no such
limitation in the Constitution.”).
246. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). The Act required that local law
enforcement officials to participate in the administration of federal gun registration and
background check policies. Id. at 904.
247. Id. at 905.
248. Id. at 907.
249. Id. at 907-08.
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of precisely the opposite assumption.”250 The majority suggested that
Congress might have the power to make recommendations to the states,
but not commands.251
Here, Justice Scalia echoed Justice O’Connor’s views from Garcia,
Ashcroft, and New York: “Although the States surrendered many of their
powers to the new Federal Government, they retained a ‘residuary and
inviolable sovereignty.’ ” 252
Residual state sovereignty was also implicit . . . in the Constitution’s
conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but only
discrete, enumerated ones . . . expressed by the Tenth Amendment’s
assertion that ‘the powers not delegated to the United States . . . are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.253

In Printz, the Court went even further, suggesting that the Brady
Act violated not only federalism principles of state sovereignty and the
Tenth Amendment, but also extended Congressional power over the
states and shifted the balance of power among the three branches of the
national government. First, “the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution
that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not
States.”254 “The power of the Federal Government would be augmented
immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service—and at no cost
to itself—the police officers of the 50 States.”255 Second, it would also
disturb the separation and balance of powers between the three branches
of the federal government itself.256 “The Constitution does not leave to
speculation who is to administer the laws enacted by Congress; the
President, it says, ‘shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’
personally and through officers whom he appoints.”257 Yet, the Brady
Act effectively transfers this presidential responsibility to thousands of
chief law enforcement officers.258 Of course, the logic of the majority’s
opinion invites the executive branch to expand and hire thousands of
additional federal officers. Such a result would not diminish federal
power or protect state sovereignty. It would simply create a larger
federal bureaucracy, a fact not lost on the dissenters.259

250.
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Id. at 909.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 909.
Id. at 918-19.
Id. at 919.
Id. at 920 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).
Id. at 922.
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According to the majority, the dissent’s view was that the
Commerce Clause, taken with the power to “make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper,” conclusively established the Brady Act’s
constitutional validity.260 However, Justice Scalia, citing The Federalist
No. 33, argued:
What destroys the dissent’s Necessary and Proper Clause argument,
however, is not the Tenth Amendment but the Necessary and Proper
Clause itself. When a “La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution” the
Commerce Clause violates the principles of state sovereignty
reflected in the various constitutional provisions . . . it is not a “La[w]
. . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,” and
is thus, in the words of The Federalist, “merely [an] act of
usurpation” which “deserve[s] to be treated as such.”261

Again, the Court’s opinion tracked the views of Justice O’Connor
regarding the spirit of the Constitution. Implied principles of state
sovereignty limit the scope of the Commerce power and the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Yet, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged no such
implied limits on federal legislative authority. He only recognized those
set out in the Constitution. There is no doubt that Marshall was a
Federalist. The views expressed by Justice Scalia were more consistent
with what Marshall called the anti-federal spirit.
Justice O’Connor, concurring, wrote that the Brady Act violated the
Tenth Amendment to the extent that it “forces States and local law
enforcement officers to perform background checks on prospective
handgun owners . . . .”262 For O’Connor, Congress could invite state and
local officials to participate voluntarily, or Congress could amend the
interim program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis, as
it does with a number of other federal programs.263
Justice Thomas wrote separately to emphasize that the Tenth
Amendment affirms the undeniable notion that under our Constitution
the federal government is one of enumerated, hence limited, powers.264
Thomas argued that the Government’s authority under the Commerce
Clause did not extend to the regulation of wholly intrastate transactions
and therefore, Congress lacked the power to impress state law
enforcement officers into administering and enforcing such
regulations.265 Additionally, Thomas asserted that “the Constitution . . .
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places whole areas outside the reach of Congress’ regulatory
authority,”266 implicitly rejecting the Court’s holding in Garcia.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joined, dissented: “When Congress exercises the powers delegated to it
by the Constitution, it may impose affirmative obligations on executive
and judicial officers of state and local governments as well as ordinary
citizens.”267 The dissenters believed that the Commerce Clause, coupled
with the Necessary and Proper Clause, permitted the temporary
enlistment of local law enforcement officers necessary to end the
“epidemic of gun violence.”268 For the dissenters, “the Tenth
Amendment imposes no restriction on the exercise of delegated
powers”; the language of the Tenth Amendment plainly refers to only
powers not delegated to Congress.269
The dissenters noted the perverse logic of the majority’s state
sovereignty/states’ rights argument:
[T]he majority’s rule seems more likely to damage than to preserve
the safeguards against tyranny provided by the existence of vital state
governments. By limiting the ability of the Federal Government to
enlist state officials in the implementation of its programs, the Court
creates incentives for the National Government to aggrandize itself.
In the name of State’s rights, the majority would have the Federal
Government create vast national bureaucracies to implement its
policies.270

The dissenters argued that the majority’s reasoning contradicted the
Court’s analysis in New York.271 “That decision squarely approved of
cooperative federalism programs, designed at the national level but
implemented principally by state governments. New York disapproved
of a particular method of putting such programs into place, not the
existence of federal programs implemented locally.”272 The dissenters
contested how the majority relied on the anti-commandeering principle
to argue “the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program.”273 According to the dissent,
that language was merely dictum and wholly unnecessary to the holding
in that case.274
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What emerges from the above-referenced opinions is a sharp
division within the Court about the nature of federal power and how such
power is affected by competing understandings of state sovereignty
principles. That division mirrors the views set out by Federalists and
anti-federalists two-plus centuries ago. However, those Justices who
have championed implied limits on federal legislative power do not link
their concerns with their anti-federalist ancestors. Instead, they cite
sparingly to a Federalist, notwithstanding the fact that their arguments
track much more closely those who opposed the Constitution.
B. NFIB v. Sebelius and Its Anti-Federal Implications
1. NFIB v. Sebelius
In Sebelius, the Court once again invoked implied, unenumerated
limits on federal legislative power with regard to the individual mandate
and the Medicaid expansion requirements found in the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (ACA).275 Chief Justice Roberts asserted that
the Court must “determine whether the Constitution grants Congress
powers it now asserts, but which many States and individuals believe it
does not possess.”276
In turn, the Court reviewed the nature of Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, as
well as under the Spending and Taxing Clauses.277 In sum, the Court
upheld the individual mandate pursuant to Congress’ Taxing Power, but
not under its Commerce Clause power or Necessary and Proper Clause
powers.278 As for the Medicaid expansion provision, the Court held that
Congress could use its power under the Spending Clause to encourage
states to adopt the new coverage standards; but Congress could not
threaten or coerce the states by the withdrawal of all previously allocated
funds for Medicaid, effectively setting new limits on Congress’
Spending power.279
Here, the focus of the analysis is not on the Court’s holdings, but
rather on what Roberts wrote about our federalist system and the nature
of federal legislative power, and the contrast between Roberts’ views
and those presented by Chief Justice Marshall two centuries earlier.
Despite a generic nod to Marshall’s opinions in McCulloch and
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Gibbons280 and one specific line from one of Marshall’s A Friend of the
Constitution letters in defense of McCulloch,281 Roberts did not embrace
Marshall’s expansive views of federalism, federal legislative powers, or
Marshall’s doctrine of implied powers. Indeed, Roberts’ framing
principles read more like an anti-federal guidebook, borrowing heavily
from the anti-federalist perspectives from the late Eighteenth Century,
and from Justice O’Connor’s views in New York and related cases.
2. The Silent Repudiation of Marshallian Federalism
The central question for the Court was whether Congress had the
power under the Constitution to enact the challenged ACA provisions.
To answer that question, Roberts wrote that, “In our federal system, the
National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and the
people retain the remainder.”282 He then referenced Chief Justice
Marshall and McCulloch,283 as if Marshall’s opinion is in accord with
the Court’s conclusions in Sebelius. Of course, the two opinions are not
aligned. There is zero chance that Marshall would have joined the
majority in Sebelius.
Roberts continued, citing another Marshall opinion,
The Federal Government “is acknowledged by all to be one of
enumerated powers.” That is, rather than granting general authority
to perform all the conceivable functions of government, the
Constitution lists, or enumerates, the Federal Government’s
powers. . . . The enumeration is also a limitation of powers, because
“[t]he enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.”284

By ignoring the Court’s holdings and rationales and instead drawing
selectively from dicta, Roberts gave his readers the impression that he
was following Marshallian federalism. That is misleading at best. It is
deceptive at worst.
Roberts’ anti-federal spirit is unmistakable. In his view, the federal
government can exercise only the powers granted to it.285 And, if no
enumerated power authorizes Congress to pass a certain law, that law
may not be enacted, even if it would not violate any of the express limits
in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution.286 For Roberts,
this principle was affirmed in the Tenth Amendment: “The powers not
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delegated to the United States by the Constitution [nor prohibited by it
to the States] are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”287
One obvious obstacle to Roberts’ implying such a limit from the Tenth
Amendment is its text. The Tenth Amendment has no textual application
to delegated powers, unless the Court declares an unenumerated
application and limitation.
For Roberts, then, the federal government must show that a
constitutional grant of power authorizes each of its actions.288 The Chief
Justice indicated it does not work the same way for the states, “because
the Constitution is not the source of their power.”289 The states can and
do perform many vital functions of modern government under their
general police powers, powers not possessed by the federal
government.290 But there is nothing in the Constitution suggesting the
national government does not have police powers, for example, during a
global pandemic. Indeed, the Court could just as plausibly read
Congress’ Article I powers to include them. Additionally, Roberts omits
discussing all the ways the Constitution expressly restricts the states.
Next, Roberts turned to state sovereignty principles, explaining:
“State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism
secures to the citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power.” Because the police power is controlled by 50
different states instead of one national sovereign, the facets of
governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives are normally
administered by smaller governments closer to the governed. The
Framers thus ensured that powers which “in the ordinary course of
affairs concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people” were
held by governments more local and more accountable than a distant
federal bureaucracy.291

Thus, “[t]he independent power of the States also serves as a check on
the power of the Federal Government . . . .”292 In such principles, I hear
echoes of anti-federalism, not Marshallian federalism.
The Sebelius Court proceeded to evaluate several of Congress’
delegated powers, reading each carefully to “avoid creating a general
federal authority akin to the States’ police powers.”293 Such a reading is
possible only through a lens grounded on implied limits on delegated
federal power, not textual ones.
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3. The Anti-Federal Spirit of the Doctrine of Implied Limits
Roberts concluded with a reminder that there can be no question
that it is the responsibility of the Court to enforce the limits on federal
power by striking down acts of Congress that transgress the limits the
Constitution carefully constructed.294 But this admonition is misleading.
In Marbury, the Court found that Congress had no statutory power to
alter an express provision of the Constitution regarding the Court’s
original jurisdiction.295 On the contrary, in Sebelius, the Court identified
no textual provisions violated by Congress’ enactment of the ACA.296
Applying the above guiding principles, the Court concluded that
Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause powers, but that Congress
had authority under its taxing power to enact the individual mandate, and
under its spending power to enact part of the Medicaid expansion
provisions, but to threaten withdrawal of all previously allocated
Medicaid funding.297 In reaching its decision, the Court implied
unenumerated limits on delegated federal legislative powers, reading
state power and state sovereignty as independent and paramount to
federal power.298 That is the type of argument and analysis that
Maryland presented in McCulloch, which Chief Justice Marshall flatly
rejected.299 Similar arguments were made by the government in Garcia,
but were rejected by the Court as unsound and unworkable.300
Even though the Tenth Amendment by its text is not a limit on
delegated federal powers, the Sebelius Court uses it, as Justice O’Connor
did in New York v. United States, to derive an expansive state
sovereignty doctrine that implicitly limits enumerated federal powers.
Under that view, federal powers are not plenary.301 They are not
exercisable to their utmost extent. Federal powers are limited by
unenumerated principles beyond those express restraints set forth in the
Constitution.302
There are two principal objections to this analysis. First, it is a
disguised repudiation of Marshallian federalism, including his doctrine
of implied powers. Second, it is grounded more on anti-federalist
thought than on federalist thought and principles.
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The Court is free to re-map the meaning of federalism, but it should
do so openly, acknowledging its rejection of Marshall’s views on
federalism. The Court should explain why Marshall was wrong in cases
like McCulloch and Gibbons, and why other Justices were wrong in
subsequent opinions that adopted Marshall’s reasoning, such as Wickard
v. Filburn,303 Heart of Atlanta,304 Katzenbach,305 Garcia,306 and
Gonzales,307 all upholding an expansive view of delegated federal
legislative power.
Second, the Court should hold itself accountable, explaining to its
audience that its view that smaller, more local governmental power is
better and was regularly articulated by anti-federalists two centuries ago.
It was not the view of Federalists. It is misleading for the Court to cite
Marshall to imply he would have agreed with the Court’s views, for
example, in Sebelius.308
Likewise, construing the Constitution to create implied limits on
delegated federal powers beyond those set out in the text is not
fundamentally different from reading the Due Process Clause to embrace
unenumerated rights as in Lochner v. New York,309 a move frequently
criticized by many of the Justices who have championed the doctrine of
implied limits on delegated federal powers.310
V. CONCLUSION
Access to health care has been a significant national concern for the
past three decades. As a policy matter, reasonable people might disagree
about whether health insurance, or more broadly, access to affordable
health care, should be available to all Americans. I support universal
health insurance. Indeed, I happen to think that no member of the
national government should receive better government-provided health
insurance than any other American. That means no special COVID
cocktail treatments for them, while other Americans languish from
health disparities and die. But, my views are not controlling on such a
policy question, debated and resolved within the national legislature.
Yet, I am not convinced that it is the province of the Supreme Court to
interject itself into such a policy debate by announcing implied,
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unenumerated limits on federal legislative power. It is not the duty of
the Court to give the Constitution an anti-federal reading. Doing so is
inconsistent with Marbury v. Madison’s federalist assertion of judicial
review. Surely Chief Justice Roberts does not intend to undermine
Marbury. Yet, McCulloch and Gibbons were certainly cut from the same
broad federalist cloth.
Moreover, an anti-federal reading of federal legislative power has
broad implications for significant areas of national policy and regulation,
including climate change, voter suppression, policing violence, criminal
justice, sexual violence, income inequality and poverty, educational
equity, foreign threats, pandemic mandates, and access to affordable
health care, among others. No state has the ability or the authority to
address such areas for the whole nation. The Constitution vests such
power in the elected national legislature. Absent specific textual limits
on federal legislative power, it is neither the province nor duty of the
Court to read Article I through an anti-federal lens. The states are
protected in our federal system by its structure, not by reading state
sovereignty principles so broadly as to demean the powers of a co-equal
branch of the national government or by turning upside down the powers
of the national government relative to the states. Members of the Court
must never forget it is a federalist Constitution they are expounding.

